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Abstract. Code-based cryptography is an interesting alternative to clas-
sic number-theory PKC since it is conjectured to be secure against quan-
tum computer attacks. Many families of codes have been proposed for
these cryptosystems, one of the main requirements is having high per-
formance t-bounded decoding algorithms which in the case of having
high an error-correcting pair is achieved. In this article the class of codes
with a t-ECP is proposed for the McEliece cryptosystem. The hardness
of retrieving the t-ECP for a given code is considered. As a first step
distinguishers of several subclasses are given.
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1 Introduction
The notion of Public Key Cryptography (PKC) was first introduced in 1976 [10]
by Diffie and Helman, though Merkle had previously developed some of the key
concepts [32]. The main advantage with respect to symmetric-key cryptography
is that it does not require an initial exchange of secrets between sender and re-
ceiver. In the survey paper [23] it is stated that
“At the heart of any public-key cryptosystem is a one-way function - a func-
tion y = f(x) that is easy to evaluate but for which is computationally infeasible
(one hopes) to find the inverse x = f−1(y)”.
The most famous trapdoor one-way functions are:
– Integer factorization where x = (p, q) is a pair of prime numbers and
y = pq is its product. The best-known example of PKC is the Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) cryptosystem whose security is based on the hardness of
⋆ The first author is partially supported by Spanish MCINN under project MTM2007-
64704 and by a FPU grant AP2008-01598 by Spanish MEC.
distinguishing prime numbers from composite number, i.e. the intractability
of inverting this one-way function.
– Discrete logarithm for which a group G (written multiplicatively) and an
element a ∈ G are required, then x is an integer and y = ax. The security of
the ElGamal cryptosystem or the Diffie-Hellman key exchange depends on
the difficulty of finding discrete logarithms modulo a large prime.
– Elliptic curve discrete logarithm which it is actually a particular case of
the previous function when G is taken as an elliptic curve group. Then x = P
is a point on the curve and y = kP is another point on the curve obtained by
the multiplication of P with a scalar k. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
proposed independently by Koblitz [22] and Miller [33] in 1985 is based on
the difficulty of this function in the group of points on an elliptic curve over
a finite field.
However with the discovery of Shor’s algorithm [46] anyone with a quan-
tum computer can break in polynomial time all cryptosystems whose security
depends on the difficulty of the previous problem. Post-quantum cryptography
gave birth to the next generation of cryptography algorithms, which are designed
to run on conventional computers but no attacks by classical or quantum com-
puters are known against them. See [5] for an overview of the state of the art
in this area. Code-based cryptosystems such as McEliece [31] and Niederreiter
[35] cryptosystems are interesting candidates for post-quantum cryptography.
See the surveys [7,13,37,44,45].
The security of code-based cryptosystems is connected to the hardness of
the general decoding problem which was shown by Berlekamp-McEliece-Van
Tilborg [2,4] to be NP-hard, even if preprocessing is allowed [8]. However it is
not known whether this problem is almost always or in the average difficult. The
problem of minimum distance decoding with input (G,y) where G is a generator
matrix of a code C over Fq of parameters [n, k, d] addresses to determine a
codeword c ∈ C of minimal distance to y. The bounded distance decoding problem
depends on a function t(n, k, d). The input is again (G,y) but the output is a
codeword c ∈ C (if any) verifying that d(y, C) ≤ t(n, k, d), where d(·, ·) denotes
the hamming distance between two vectors on Fnq . Moreover decoding up to
half the minimum distance is a bounded distance decoding problem such that
t(n, k, d) ≤ ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ for all n, k and d.
All known minimum distance decoding algorithm for general codes have ex-
ponential complexity in the length of the code. However there are several classes
of codes such as the Reed-Solomon, BCH, Goppa or algebraic geometry codes
which have polynomial decoding algorithms that correct up to a certain bound
which is at most half the minimum distance.
The problems posed above have two parts [19]. Firstly the preprocessing part
done at a laboratory or a factory where for an appropriate code C a decoder AC
is built which is allowed to be time consuming. Secondly the actual operating of
the many copies of the decoder for consumers which should work very fast. So we
can consider the problem ofminimum distance decoding with preprocessing. From
the error-correction point of view it seems pointless to decode a bad code, but
for breaking the McEliece cryptosystem one must be able to decode efficiently
all, or almost all, codes.
In 1978 [31] McEliece presents the first PKC based on the theory of error-
correcting codes. Its main advantages are its fast encryption and decryption
schemes. However the large key size of its public key makes it very difficult
to use in many practical situations. In this cryptosystem the public key space
K is the collection of all generator matrices of a chosen class of codes that
have an efficient decoding algorithm that corrects all patterns of t errors, the
plaintext space is P = Fkq ×Wn,q,t, where Wn,q,t is the collection of all e ∈ F
n
q
of weight t, and the ciphertext space is C = Fnq . The sample space is given by
Ω = P×K. The encryption map EG : P → C for a given key G ∈ K is defined by
EG(m, e) =mG+ e. An adversary A is a map from C ×K to P . This adversary
is successful for (x,G) ∈ Ω if A(EG(x), G) = x.
Let C be a class of codes such that every code C in C has an efficient decoding
algorithm correcting all patterns of t errors. Let G ∈ Fk×nq be a generator matrix
of C. In order to mask the origin of G, take a k × k invertible matrix S over Fq
and an n× n permutation or monomial matrix P . Then for the McEliece PKC
the matrices G, S and P are kept secret while G′ = SGP is public. Furthermore
the (trapdoor) one-way function of this cryptosystem is usually presented as
follows:
x = (m, e) 7→ y =mG′ + e,
wherem ∈ Fkq is the plaintext and e ∈ F
n
q is a random error vector with hamming
weight at most t.
McEliece proposed to use the family of Goppa codes. The problem of bounded
distance decoding for the class of codes that have the same parameters as the
Goppa codes is difficult in the worst-case [15]. However, it is still an open problem
whether decoding up to half the minimum distance is NP-hard which is the
security basis of the McEliece cryptosystem. Algebraic geometry codes were also
proposed for the McEliece PKC in [20,34]. The security of this PKC is based on
two assumptions [7,21]:
A.1 In the average it is difficult to decode t errors for all codes that have the
same parameters as the codes used as key,
A.2 It is difficult to distinguish arbitrary codes from those coming from K.
Concerning the first assumption it might be that the class of codes is too
small or too rigid. For instance Sidelnikov-Shestakov [50] gave an adversary
that is always successful if one take for public key space the generator matrices
of generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes. Concerning the second assumption
recent progress is made by Fauge`re et al. [14,36] where they showed that one
could distinguish between high rate Goppa, alternant and random codes.
In 1986 [35] Niederreiter presented a dual version of McEliece cryptosys-
tem which is equivalent in terms of security [26]. Niederreiter’s system differs
from McEliece’s system in the public-key structure (it use a parity check matrix
instead of a generator matrix of the code), in the encryption mechanism (we
compute the syndrome of a message by the public key) and in the decryption
message. In its original paper Niederreiter proposed the class of GRS codes.
Let H ∈ F
(n−k)×n
q be a parity check matrix of a code C in C. H is masked
by H ′ = SHP , where S is an invertible matrix over Fq of size n − k and P is
an n× n permutation or monomial matrix. The (trapdoor) one-way function in
case of the Niederreiter PKC is presented by
x = e 7→ y = eH ′T ,
where e ∈ Fnq has weight t.
In a syndrome based (SB) hash function [1,17,16] an n×r parity check matrix
H is chosen at random, then SB hash system is given by a procedure that encodes
s bits of information into a word e of length n and weight t. The one-way function
in this case (which has no trapdoor) is given by
x = e 7→ y = eHT .
It was shown in [12,40,41] that the known efficient bounded distance decoding
algorithms of Reed-Solomon, BCH, Goppa and algebraic geometry codes can be
described by a basic algorithm using an error correcting pair. That means that
the proposed McEliece cryptosystem are not based on the inherent tractability
of bounded distance decoding but on the one-way function
x = (A,B) 7→ y = A ∗B,
where (A,B) is a t-error-correcting pair.
Consider Ct, the class of linear codes over Fq that have a t-error correcting
pair over an extension of Fq. It was shown by Pellikaan [40] that codes of this
family have an efficient decoding algorithm that corrects up to t errors. This
makes them appropriate for code-based cryptography. Note that most families
of codes used in such cryptosystems belong to Ct such as the generalized Reed-
Solomon codes, the Goppa codes, the alternant codes and the algebraic-geometry
codes.
For further details on the notion of error-correcting pair see Section 2 where
we formally review this definition and we give a brief survey on the properties
that are relevant to this work.
The aim of this paper is to study the subclass of Ct formed by those linear
codes C whose error correcting pair is not easily reconstructed from C . Section
3 deals with the security status of this scheme, detailing the state-of-art and the
existence of error-correcting pairs for families of codes most commonly used in
code-based cryptography.
Finally, in Section 4, following the work of Fauge`re et al. [14], we present
distinguishers for several families of codes. Recall that the hardness of the dis-
tinguishing problem was part of the basis of the security of code-based cryp-
tosystems.
2 Error-correcting pairs
From now on the dimension of a linear code C will be denoted by k(C) and its
minimum distance by d(C). Given two elements a and b on Fnq , the star multipli-
cation is defined by coordinatewise multiplication, that is a∗b = (a1b1, . . . , anbn)
while the standard inner multiplication is defined by a·b =
∑n
i=1 aibi. In general,
for two subsets A and B of Fnq the set A∗B is given by {a∗b | a ∈ A and b ∈ B}.
Furthermore A ⊥ B if and only if a · b = 0 for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B.
Definition 1. Let C be a linear code in Fnq . The pair (A,B) of F
n
qm is called a
t-error correcting pair (ECP) for C if the following properties hold:
E.1 (A ∗B) ⊥ C,
E.2 K(A) > t,
E.3 d(B⊥) > t,
E.4 d(A) + d(C) > n.
The notion of an error-correcting pair for a linear code was introduced inde-
pendently by Pellikaan in [38] and Ko¨tter in [24]. In [38] it is shown that a linear
code in Fnq with a t-error correcting pair has a decoding algorithm which cor-
rects up to t errors with complexity O(n3). Furthermore the minimum distance
of such linear code is at least 2t+ 1.
The existence of ECP for generalized Reed-Solomon and Algebraic codes was
shown in [38] and for many cyclic codes Duursma and Ko¨tter in [12] have found
ECP which correct beyond the designed BCH capacity.
Note that if E.4 is replaced by the following statements
E.5 d(A⊥) > 1 i.e. A is a non-degenerated code,
E.6 d(A) + 2t > n.
then d(C) ≥ 2t+ 1 and (A,B) is a t-ECP for C.
3 Error-correcting pairs for public key cryptosystems
Let Pt be the collection of pairs (A,B) such that A, B are linear codes over some
extension of Fq, A is non-degenerated and (A,B) is a t-error correcting pair for
some linear code C in Fnq . We consider the following one way function
ϕ : Pt −→ F
n
q
x = (A,B) 7−→ y = A ∗B
Let U and V be two generator matrices with rows denoted by ui and vi,
respectively, U∗V be the matrix form by the rows ui∗vj ordered lexicographically
and red(U ∗ V ) be the matrix obtained from U ∗ V by deleting dependent rows.
Then the implementation of ϕ may be given by
(U, V ) 7−→ y = red(U ∗ V )
Firstly we note that uP ∗vP = (u ∗v)P for every permutation or monomial
matrix P . Thus, if (A,B) is a t-ECP for C, then (AP,BP ) is a t-ECP for P−1C.
Furthermore, let S1 and S2 be invertible matrices of the correct sizes to be
multiplied by the matrices U and V , respectively, then U ∗V generates the same
code as (S1U)∗ (S2V ) since (S1U)∗v = S1(U ∗v) and u∗ (S2V ) = S2(u∗V ) for
all vectors u and v. Therefore the masking H ′ = SHP by means of an invertible
matrix S and a permutation matrix P is already incorporated in the choice of
the pair of generator matrices (U, V ).
Let C be the code with the elements of A ∗ B as parity checks. If the one-
way function ϕ is indeed difficult to invert, then the code C with parity check
matrix H = red(U ∗ V ) might be used as a public-key in a coding based PKC.
Otherwise it would mean that the PKC based on codes that can be decoded by
error-correcting pairs is not secure. In the following we consider seven collections
of pairs.
Example 1. The class of GRS codes was proposed for code-based PKC by Nieder-
reiter [35]. However this proposal is completely broken by the Sidelnikov-Shestakov
attack given in [50].
Let a be an n-tuple of mutually distinct elements of Fq and be an n-tuple of
nonzero elements of Fq. Then the generalized Reed-Solomon code GRSk(a,b) is
defined by
GRSk(a,b) = {(f(a1)b1, . . . , f(an)bn) | f(X) ∈ Fq[X ] and deg(f(X)) < k} .
That is, if we define by induction a1 = a and ai+1 = a ∗ ai, then GRSk(a,b) is
generated by the elements b ∗ ai with i = 0, . . . , k − 1, i.e. if k ≤ n ≤ q, then
GRSk(a,b) is an [n, k, n− k + 1] code. Furthermore the dual of a GRS code is
again a GRS code, in particular GRSk(a,b)
⊥ = GRSn−k(a,b
′) for some b′ that
is explicitly known.
Let A = GRSt+1(a,u), B = GRSt(a,v) and C = GRS2t(a,u∗v)
⊥. Then (A,B)
is a t-ECP for C. Conversely let C = GRSk(a,b), then A = GRSt+1(a,b
′) and
B = GRSt(a,1) is a t-ECP for C where t =
⌊
n−k
2
⌋
and b′ ∈ Fnq is a nonzero
vector verifying that GRSk(a,b)
⊥ = GRSn−k(a,b
′).
So GRS codes are the prime examples of codes that have a t-error-correcting
pair. Moreover if C is an [n, n − 2t, 2t + 1] code which has a t-error-correcting
pair, then C is a generalized Reed-Solomon. This is trivial if t = 1, proved for
t = 2 in [41, Theorem 6.5] and for arbitrary t in [30].
Example 2. Error-correcting pairs for cyclic codes were found by Duursma and
Ko¨tter [11,12,25]. Cyclic codes are not considered for applications in code-based
PKC.
Example 3. The class of subcodes of GRS codes was proposed by Berger-Loidreau
[3] for code-based PKC to resist precisely the Sidelnikov-Shestakov attack. But
for certain parameter choices this proposal is also not secure as shown by Wi-
eschebrink [51,52] and Ma´rquez et al. [29].
Let C be a subcode of the code GRSn−2t(a,b). This GRS code has a t-error-
correcting pair by Example 1 which is also a t-ECP for C.
Example 4. Goppa codes were proposed for McEliece PKC by its author [31].
Sidelnikov-Shestakov made a claim [50] that their method for GRS codes could
be extended to attack Goppa codes as well, but this was never substantiated by a
paper in the public domain. In its original paper McEliece recommend the class
of binary Goppa codes with parameters [1024, 524, 101], but this proposal is no
longer secure with nowadays computing power as shown in Peters et al. [6,42,43]
by improving decoding algorithms for general codes. The attack of Wieschebrink
[52] is not yet efficient enough to be applicable to these codes.
A Goppa code associated to a Goppa polynomial of degree r can be viewed as
an alternant code, that is a subfield subcode of GRS code of codimension r and
therefore they have also a ⌊r/2⌋-error-correcting pair. In the binary case with
an associated square free polynomial the Goppa code has an r-ECP.
Example 5. Algebraic geometry (AG) codes were introduced in 1977 by V.D.
Goppa and were proposed by Janwa-Moreno [20] for the McEliece PKC. Recall
that GRS codes can be seen as the class of AG codes on the projective line, i.e.
the algebraic curve of genus zero. We refer the interested reader to [18,48,49].
Let X be an algebraic curve defined over Fq with genus g. By an algebraic curve
we mean a curve that is absolutely irreducible, nonsingular and projective. Let P
be an n-tuple of Fq-rational points on X and let E be a divisor of X with disjoint
support from P of degree m. Then the algebraic geometry code CL(X ,P , E) is
the image of the Riemann-Roch space L(E) of rational functions with prescribed
behavior of zeros and poles at E under the evaluation map evP . If m < n, then
the dimension of the code CL(X ,P , E) is at least m + 1 − g and its minimum
distance is at least n −m. If m > 2g − 2, then its dimension is m+ 1 − g. The
dual code CL(X ,P , E)
⊥ is again AG. If m > 2g − 2, then the dimension of the
code CL(X ,P , E)
⊥ is at least n−m−1+g and its minimum distance is at least
d∗ = m− 2g + 2. If m < n, then its dimension is n−m− 1 + g.
If A = CL(X ,P , E) and B = CL(X ,P , F ), then 〈A ∗B〉 ⊆ CL(X ,P , E +F ). So
there are abundant ways to construct error-correcting pairs of an AG code. An
AG code on a curve of genus g with designed minimum distance d∗ has a t-ECP
over Fq with t = ⌊(d
∗ − 1 − g)/2⌋ by [39, Theorem 1] and [40, Theorem 3.3]. If
e is sufficiently large, then there exists a t-ECP over Fqe with t = ⌊(d
∗ − 1)/2⌋
by [41, Proposition 4.2].
It was shown by Ma´rquez et al. [28,27] that these codes are not secure for rates
R in the intervals [γ, 12 − γ], [
1
2 + γ, 1− γ], [
1
2 − γ, 1− 3γ] and [3γ,
1
2 + γ], where
R = k/n is the information rate and γ = g/n the relative genus.
Geometric Goppa codes, which are subfield subcodes of Algebraic geometry
codes [47] generalizing the classical Goppa codes that are subfield subcodes of
GRS codes, were proposed for the McEliece PKC by Janwa-Moreno [20].
Example 6. If (A,B) is a pair of codes with parameters [n, t + 1, n − t] and
[n, t, n− t + 1], respectively, and C = (A ∗ B)⊥, then the minimum distance of
C is at least 2t+1 and (A,B) is a t-error-correcting pair for C by [41, Corollary
3.4]. The dimension of 〈A ∗ B〉 is at most t(t + 1). So the dimension of C is at
least n − t(t + 1). In Appendix A it will be shown that this is almost always
equal to n− t(t+ 1) for random choices of A and B.
If q is considerably larger than n, then a random code is MDS. So taking random
codes A and B of length n and dimensions t+1 and t, respectively, gives a very
large class of code for the McEliece PKC. However with large field the key size
becomes larger and recall that the main obstacle for coded-based crypto systems
was the key size.
Example 7. If (A,B) is a pair of codes that satisfy the conditions (E.1), (E.2),
(E.3), (E.5) and (E.6), then the minimum distance of C is at least 2t + 1 and
(A,B) is a t-error-correcting pair for C by [41, Corollary 3.4].
4 Distinguishing a code with an ECP
Let K be a collection of generator matrices of codes that have a t-error-correcting
pair and that is used for a coded-based PKC system. In this section we address
assumption A.2 whether we can distinguish arbitrary codes from those coming
from K.
Let C be a k dimensional subspace of Fnq with basis g1, . . . ,gk which rep-
resents the rows of the generator matrix G ∈ Fk×nq . We denote by S
2(C) the
second symmetric power of C, or equivalently the symmetrized tensor product
of C with itself. If xi = gi, then S
2(C) has basis {xixj | 1 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ n} and di-
mension
(
k+1
2
)
. Furthermore we denote by 〈C ∗C〉 or C(2) the square of C, that
is the linear subspace in Fnq generated by {a ∗ b|a,b ∈ C}. See [9, §4 Definition
6] and [29,52]. Now, following the same scheme as in [28], we consider the linear
map
σ : S2(C) −→ C(2),
where the element xixj is mapped to gi ∗ gj . The kernel of this map will be
denoted by K2(C). Then K2(C) is the solution space of the following set of
equations: ∑
1≤i≤i′≤k
gijgi′jXii′ = 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
There is no loss of generality in assuming G to be systematic at the first k po-
sition, making a suitable permutation of columns and applying Gaussian elim-
ination, if necessary. Then G =
(
Ik P
)
where Ik is the k × k identity matrix
and P is an k × (n − k) matrix formed by the last n − k columns of G. Now
H =
(
PT −In−k
)
is a parity check matrix of C, or equivalently H is a generator
matrix of the [n, n− k] code D = C⊥.
In [14, §3] and [36, Ch. 10] a system LP associated to the matrix P of k
linear equations involving the
(
n−k
2
)
variables Zjl, with k + 1 ≤ j < l ≤ n, is
defined as
LP =


∑
k<j<j′≤n
pijpij′Zjj′ = 0 | 1 ≤ i ≤ k.


This system differs from the system of equations obtained for the kernel
K2(C) in interchanging indices i and j and the strict inequality j < j′ in the
summation, instead of i ≤ i′. Denote the kernel of LP , that is the space of all
solutions of LP , by K(LP ).
Proposition 1.
dimK(LP ) = dimK
2(D)
Proof. Let M be the
(
k+1
2
)
× n matrix with entries (gijgi′j)1≤i≤i′≤k
1≤j≤n
. Then a
basis of K2(C) can be read of directly as the kernel of M . Note also that the
dimension of C(2) is equal to the rank ofM . Furthermore, since C(2) is the image
of the linear map σ, by the first isomorphism theorem we get:
dimK2(C) + dimC(2) = dimS2(C) =
(
k + 1
2
)
.
Let hi be the i-th row of the parity check matrix H , ei be the i-th vector
in the canonical basis of Fn−kq and qi be the i-th row of the matrix P
T . Then
qij = pj,i+k and hi = (qi| − ei). Therefore
hj ∗ hj′ =
{(
qj ∗ qj ej
)
if j = j′,(
qj ∗ qj′ 0
)
if j < j′.
Let M1 be the k ×
(
n−k
2
)
matrix with entries (pijpij′ )1≤i≤k
k<j<j′≤n
, then
dimK(LP ) =
(
n− k
2
)
− rank(M1)
Now letM2 be the
(
n−k+1
2
)
×n matrix with entries (hijhi′j)1≤i≤i′≤n−k
1≤j≤n
. Then
dimD(2) = rank(M2) = n− k + rank(M1)
Therefore
dimK(LP ) =
(
n− k
2
)
− rank(M1)
=
(
n− k
2
)
+ n− k − dimD(2)
= dimK2(D)
⊓⊔
The dual statement of Proposition 1 gives: dimK(LPT ) = dimK
2(C).
For every [n, k] code C over Fq the following inequality holds:
dimC(2) ≤ min{n,
(
k+1
2
)
}.
However if the entries of the matrix P are taken independently and identically
distributed, then the inequality holds with equality with high probability what
is actually proved in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let C be an [n, k] code with n >
(
k+1
2
)
chosen at random. Then
Pr
(
dim(C
(2)
random) =
(
k + 1
2
))
= 1
Proof. Let C be a linear code with parameters [n, k] over Fq with n >
(
k+1
2
)
.
We have seen in the proof of Proposition 1, with the role of C and D = C⊥
interchanged that the linear system LPT associated with C consists of n − k
linear equations and
(
k
2
)
unknowns. In case n−k >
(
k
2
)
or equivalently n >
(
k+1
2
)
Fauge`re et al. [14] proved that the dimension of the solution space of LPT is 0
with high probability. Therefore under the same hypothesis we have that the
dimension of C
(2)
random is
(
k+1
2
)
with high probability. ⊓⊔
Example 8. Let C be a GRS code with parameters [n, k], take for instance C =
GRSk(a,b) where a is an n-tuple of mutually distinct elements of Fq and b is
an n-tuple of nonzero elements of Fq. Then C
(2) is the code GRS2k−1(a,b ∗ b)
if 2k − 1 ≤ n and Fnq otherwise. Hence dimC
(2) = min{2k − 1, n}. Therefore
dimK2(C) =
(
k + 1
2
)
− (2k − 1) =
(
k − 1
2
)
if 2k − 1 ≤ n.
Example 9. Let C be a k-dimensional subcode of the code GRSl(a,b). Then
C(2) is a subcode of the code GRS2l−1(a,b ∗ b), if 2l− 1 ≤ n. Thus
dimC(2) ≤ min{2l− 1, n}.
Moreover if 4l−3k−1 < q and 2l−1 ≤
(
k+1
2
)
, then it was shown in [29] that C(2)
is equal to GRS2l−1(a,b ∗ b) with high probability so, under this hypothesis,
Pr
(
dimC(2) = 2l− 1
)
= 1− o(1).
The dual codeD = C⊥ contains the code GRSl(a,b)
⊥ = GRSn−l(a,b
′). That is,
D(2) contains the square of GRSn−l(a,b
′) which is equal to GRS2n−2l−1(a,b
′ ∗
b′) if 2n − 2l − 1 ≤ n, or equivalently if n ≤ 2l + 1. Recall that the star
product of the rows of a generator matrix of any linear code gives a generating
set for its square code, that is the square of any [n, s] linear code is generated
by
(
s+1
2
)
elements. In particular D(2) is generated by
(
n−k+1
2
)
elements but since
GRS2n−2l−1(a,b
′∗b′) ⊆ D(2) there are at least
(
n−l+1
2
)
−(2n−2l+1) dependent
elements of this generating set. Thus
dimD(2) ≤
(
n− k + 1
2
)
−
(
n− l + 1
2
)
+2n−2l−1 =
(
n− k + 1
2
)
−
(
n− l − 1
2
)
.
Example 10. The problem of distinguishing Goppa, alternant and random codes
from each other was studied by Fauge`re et al. in [14]. Their experimental results
give rise to a conjecture on the dimension of K(LP ) for Goppa and alternant
codes of high rate.
Example 11. Let C = CL(X ,P , E) where X is an algebraic curve over Fq of genus
g, P is an n-tuple of mutually distinct Fq-rational points of X and E is a divisor
of X with disjoint support from P of degree m. Then C(2) ⊆ CL(X ,P , 2E).
Assume moreover that 2g− 2 < m < n/2. Then C has dimension k = m+1− g
and CL(X ,P , 2E) has dimension 2m+1− g = k+m. Hence dimC
(2) ≤ k+m.
Let G be a generator matrix of an algebraic geometry code C. Take the columns
ofG as homogeneous coordinates of points in Pm−g, this gives a projective system
Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) of points in the projective space P
m−g(Fq). Sincem > 2g there
exists an embedding of the curve X in Pm−g of degree m
ϕE : X −→ P
m−g
P 7−→ ϕE(P ) = (f0(P ), . . . , fm−g(P ))
where {f0, . . . , fm−g} is a basis of L(E) such that Q = ϕE(P) lies on the curve
Y = ϕE(X ). The space I2(Q) of quadratic polynomials that vanish on Q can be
identified with K2(C). Furthermore if 2g + 2 ≤ m < 12n, then I2(Y) = I2(Q)
and I(Y), the vanishing ideal of Y, is generated by I2(Q). Now
dimK2(C) =
(
k + 1
2
)
− dimC(2) ≥
(
k
2
)
−m.
Therefore Y is given as the intersection of at least
(
k
2
)
−m quadrics in Pm−g.
For more details we refer the reader to [28].
Example 12. Let t(t+1) < n. Let (A,B) be a pair of random codes of dimension
t+ 1 and t, respectively. Take C = (A ∗B)⊥ as in Example 6. Then D = C⊥ =
〈A ∗B〉. So D(2) = 〈A(2) ∗B(2)〉. Hence
dimD(2) ≤
(
t+ 2
2
)(
t+ 1
2
)
which is about half the expected
(
t(t+1)
2
)
in case
(
t(t+1)
2
)
< n by Proposition 2,
since D has dimension t(t+ 1) with high probability by Appendix A.
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A The dimension of 〈A ∗ B〉
Let A and B be two linear codes over Fq with parameters [n, s] and [n, t],
generated by the set {a1, . . . , as} and {b1, . . . ,bt} of vectors in F
n
q , respec-
tively. Let M be an st × n matrix over Fq whose rows consist on the vectors
ai ∗ bj = (ai,1bj,1, . . . , ai,nbj,n) ∈ F
n
q with i ∈ {1, . . . , s} and j ∈ {1, . . . , t} or-
dered lexicographically. Then the rows of M form a generating set of the code
A ∗B.
Indeed M is a block-matrix consisting of s blocks Mi = (ai ∗ bj)1≤j≤t with
i ∈ {1, . . . , s} of size t×n. We define the support of a codeword c = (c1, . . . , cn)
by supp(c) = {i | ci 6= 0}. Note that if i 6∈ supp(aj) then the i-th column of Mj
consists on zeros.
In the following lines, assuming that st < n we will prove that M has full
rank with high probability. We proceed by a similar procedure as in Appendix B
of [14] where it is proved that the solution space of the linear system associated
to an arbitrary random linear code is zero with high probability.
Let E1 = supp(a1). Suppose |E1| ≥ t. Let F1 be a subset of E1 with cardinal-
ity t. To simplify notation and without loss of generality, we can always assume
that F1 corresponds to the first t elements in a1, by permuting the elements if
necessary. Let M (1) be a square submatrix of M1 formed by its first t columns,
i.e.
M (1) = (a1,jbi,j)j∈F1
1≤i≤t
∈ Ft×tq
Now we define by induction Ei := supp(ai)\Fi−1 and the subset Fi as the first
t elements of the subset, assuming that |Ei| ≥ t. The square matrix M
(i) ∈ Ft×tq
is obtained from Mi by taking the Fi-indexed columns, for i ∈ {1, . . . , s}. Then
clearly the following Lemma holds.
Lemma 1. If |Ei| ≥ t for all i ∈ {1, . . . , s} then
rank(M) ≥
s∑
i=1
rank(M (i)).
Lemma 2. If |Ei| ≥ t for all i = 1, . . . , s then
Pr
(
s∑
i=1
d(M (i)) ≥ u
)
≤ Ksq
−u2
s
where d(M (i)) = t− rank(M (i)) for i = 1, . . . , s and K is a constant depending
only on q.
Proof. See [14, Lemma 5]. ⊓⊔
Lemma 3. Let ui = n− (i− 1)t with i = {1, . . . , s}, then
Pr (|Ei| < t, | |E1| ≥ t, . . . , |Ei−1| ≥ t) ≤ e
−2
( q−1q ui−t+1)
2
ui
Proof. See [14, Lemma 6]. ⊓⊔
Theorem 1. Assume that st < n. Then for any function w(x) tending to in-
finity as x goes to infinity we have
Pr (D ≥ w(t)) = o(1),
where D = st− rank(M).
Proof. Note that if |Ei| ≥ t for i ∈ {1, . . . , s} then D ≤
∑s
i=1 d(M
(i)).
Let S1 be the event
∑s
i=1 d(M
(i)) ≥ w(t) then using Lemma 2 we have
that Pr(S1) = o(1). And let S2 be the event of having at least one Ei with
i ∈ {1, . . . , s} such that |Ei| < t. Then the probability of the complement of
event S2 is given by
Pr
(
S2
)
= Pr
(
s⋂
i=1
|Ei| ≥ t
)
=
s∏
i=1
Pr (|E1| ≥ t, . . . , |Ei| ≥ t) = 1− o(1)
by Lemma 3.
Then we deduce that the sought probability is
Pr (D ≥ w(t)) ≤ Pr (S1 ∪ S2) ≤ Pr (S1) + Pr (S2) = o(1).
⊓⊔
